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uman Death as Neocortical Deatt 
The Ethical Context 
Leonard J . Weber 
I have felt for some time that 
ethicists should be reluctant to get 
involved in discussions of the clini-
cal definition of death. The ques-
tion of whether death has occurred 
is one that demands medical, not 
ethical, expertise. 
Recent suggestions that the pa-
Mr. Weber, an assistant pro-
fessor of religious studies at Mercy 
College in Detroit, proposes three 
questions man must ask in order to 
arrive ·at a definition of death. His 
exploration examines the ethical 
context of the sanctity of personal 
life. 
tient be declared dead when the 
neocortex is dead (such as the pro-
posal by Rizzo and Yonder)1 are, 
however, much more than just dis-
cussions of how to tell when death 
has occurred. Such proposals are 
advocating a revision of our defin-
ition (social and ethical as well as 
clinical) of human death and , by 
immediate implication, of human 
life. What is at stake here concerns 
all of us. 
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The following reflections 
around three. central qu l 
about the proposed definit 
such a definition of human 
(and human life) philosopl 
satisfactory? What are the 
and/ or possible contribution 
a definition would make to rt 
ical values of our society? 
the hoped for benefits be a< 











The Sanctity of Personal l ife 
Right at the h eart of man: ques-
tions in medical ethics today is the 
question of what constitutd life 
that is really human. Rizzo a n.! Yon· 
der have posed a very important 
thesis fo r our consideration': 
With the death of the neoco rtex human 
life is ended because the potent iality to 
reflect conscio usly is eradicated in th!! 
organism.2 
When the essential prerequisite for 
human consciousness no longer exists, 
that is, when the neocortex is dead, then 
heartbeat, breathing and reflexes should 
not be regarded as signs of human life but 
rather s igns of biological life which has 
lost the o r_ganic wholeness that makes tt 
human life a nd which is in the process of 
dying o rgan by organ.3 
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Do we want to accept the notion 
that human life can be truly ended 
even in the presence of spontaneous 
heartbeat and breathing? If we do, 
we ought to consider very carefully 
what we are doing. 
To clarify the issues at stake in 
medical ethics, two conflicting ap-
proaches are sometimes compared, 
the "sanc tity of life" ethic and the 
"quality of life" ethic. The sanctity 
of life ethic holds, in essence, that 
each and every human life is intrin-
sically good; that, therefore, all 
lives are of equal value; that it is 
·always an improper attack upon 
human dignity to terminate the 
life of someone because of the con-
~ition of that life. The quality of 
hfe ethic, on the other hand , puts 
· the emphasis upon the type of life 
being lived, not upo n the fact of 
life. Some lives are o f more value 
than others; some lives sh ould not 
~ l~ved. When a certain quality of 
Ide ts no longer possible , the termi-
nation of that life is acceptable. 
While such a distinction may 
often be useful, the question at hand 
indicates that the typology must be 
refined to include a third approach 
- one that might be called the 
"sanctity of personal life" ethic. 
. The sanctity of p~rsonal life posi-
tton may very well be m ore com-
the quali t 
sense disc 
f life ethic in the fuJi 
~d above. 
T he di< ,sion surrounding the 
now famv .::ase of the 43 severely 
deformed !, fants allowed to die in 
the special-ca re nursery also indi-
cates sonw thing of the sanctity of 
personal life ethic. In the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine, the au-
thors wrote: 
Rega rding the infants, some contended 
that individuals should have a right to die 
in some circumstances such as anence· 
phaly. hydroanencephaly. and some se· 
ve rely defo rming and incapacitating con· 
dit ions. Such very defective individuals 
were considered to have little or no hope 
o f achieving meaningful " humanhood".5 
The suggestion is clear that "human-
hood" is not to be vio lated, but that 
such humanhood is also not to be 
equated with animal life of the 
human species. 
Implicit in many abortion discus-
sions also is the argument or the 
assumption that much more than 
the fact that the fetus is living is 
necessary before such life need be 
acknowledged to have the rights 
and the sanctity that are recognized 
to adhere to human life. The think-
ing, frequent in our society, that 
abortion is in many cases acceptable 
while infanticide is totally repugnant 
reflects, I think , the sanctity of 
personal life understanding in medi-
cal ethics. mon than either the quality or the 
sanctity of life approaches. In her 
study of physician's attitudes toward The essential differences between 
th~ treatment of the critically ill , the sanctity of life position and the 
Diana Crane found physicians much · sanctity of personal life position is 
less inclined to treat patients with in the understanding of what is 
sev~re brain damage than other human life. The sanctity of life ethic 
~tents.4 Yet there was no indica- defends two propositio ns: 
lion that these doctors accepted t . That human life is sacred by 
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' very fact of its extstence ; 
va lue does no t depend upo n 
certain conditio n or perfec-
•on o f that life. 
2. T ha t , there fore , a ll human lives 
are of equal value; some a re 
not of more value than othe rs. 
The sanctity of pe rsonal life e thic 
accepts the second proposition but 
not the first. The quality of life ethic, 
o n the othe r ha nd. rejects both . 
This distinguishing of three ap-
proaches in medical e thics may 
provide fo r a useful context in 
which to consider the pro posal tha t 
human death be viewed as neocor-
tical death. lt does little justice to 
proponents of such a definition to 
equate the ir views with those who, 
in the quality of life tradition, can 
defend such practices as direct e u-
thanasia. On the o ther hand, it 
should be recognized that the pro-
posal is not in co mple te agreement 
with the traditio nal sanc tity of life 
position . 
T o the question, can humanhood 
ever be lacking in the presence of 
spontaneous heartbeat and breath-
ing, the proponents o f the sanc tity 
o f life and the proponents o f the 
sanctity of pe rsonal life make dif-
ferent respo nses. Even though the 
Rizzo-Yonde r proposal was careful 
to insist that human death has oc-
curred o'nly when the physiological 
prerequisite for human conscio us-
ness has irrevocably ceased to func-
tion, it differs from the traditio nal 
sanctity of life position by empha-
sizing the physiological basis fo r a 
particular type of life, not the bio-
logical life itself of the human 
spec ies. 
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The increasingly commor en· 
dency among ethic ists to acce t ate 
the pe rsonal in their understa ing 
of man may border on a d u ~tic 
view of man's nature. There no 
doubt that man is a personal ·ing 
and that when his ability to li' as a 
personal being is diminisht his 
a bility to be fully human is n in· 
ished. But to suggest, as is ften 
done, that when personal ! is 
absent or nearly absent, " are 
talking about "mere biologica fe"6 
that has no human significanc is to 
say that it is only the perso I di· 
mension (in traditional Ian age, 
the soul of man) that rea lly c tnts. 
T o distinguish "the higher t man 
functions''? from the "veg lt ive 
functions shared by other ant als"8 
and argue that it is only the f · mer 
that adheres to the essence ( man 
appears to express a dualist i view 
o f man at the very time tha t nuch 
o f Christian theology is pridin itself 
in overcoming the "Greek du lism" 
of medieval Cqristianity. It .ould 
be eve n more ironic for mel cine. 
which has always ministered o the 
needs of the body, to adopt view 
that seems very close to d nying 
that the animal nature of m. n has 
any value . 
Witho ut denying that th re is 
much that is attrac tive and to be 
supported in the personal emphasis· 
in conte mpo rary thought, questions 
should be raised about the tendency 
to define man in such a way that his 
animal nature is nearly excluded. 
Paul Ramsey wrote: 
Man is an embodied person in such .3 
way that he is in important respects hiS 
body. He is the body of his soul no leSS 
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that he is the soul (mind, wi ll) of his body. 
There are more wa'ys to violate a human 
being , or to engage in self-violation. than 
to coerce man's free will o r h is rational 
consent. An individual's body ... belo ngs 
to him, to his humanum, his personhood 
and self-identity, in such a way that the 
bodily life cannot be reduced to the class 
of the animals over which Adam was 
given unlimited dominio n. T o suppose 
so is bound to prove anti-human-sooner 
than later. 9 
1t may be a mista ke to define 
something in terms of its specific 
difference alone. While man di ffers 
from other animals in his ability to 
reflect conscio usly, he also has very 
much in commQn with them. T he 
human animal is a n animal and, 
when animal life continues to be 
present, it would seem that human 
life would also be present in some 
sense. 
This is not to deny that certain 
capacities are more fully human 
than others. It is to say, rather, that 
even when the fullness o f human-
hood is absent, human life is still 
present. James Nelson makes an 
important distinc tio n be tween hu· 
man life and personal life: 
Human life, understood development· 
ally, can exist in pre-personal forms (as in 
the fetus), in personal fo rms (as in the 
individual with the capac ity fo r con· 
sciousness, etc.), and in p ost-personal 
forms (as in the permanently comatose 
patient). In all of these stages it is human 
life and as such it deserves o ur profo und 
respect and concern. Nevertheless, there 
are occasions in which the competition 
of values between lives makes choices 
about life's quality imperative.10 
To say that human life exists and 
should be respected even when 
personal life is not present is no t to 
solve all the ethical pro ble ms of 
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modern d icine and of contc n· 
porary ' ·ty. It is , though, to ~e.:· 
fuse to le the eth ical issues by 
denying .t human life exists. One 
o f the !11 s t reasons why we should 
go slo v.. ' accepting the definition 
of neo._, tlica l death as human death 
is that tl may be trying to solve a 
problem tn a n oblique way, thro ugh 
redefining. Obviously, it makes no 
sense to go on treating a patient 
with c erebral incapacity if such a 
person is declared dead. I wonder 
if it wo uld not be better to di rectly 
a ttack the question of when to treat 
and when no t to treat the dying pa· 
tient. 
The Impact on Medical Ethics 
On the more practical leve l, there 
a re also a number of reasons for be· 
ing reluctan t to endorse suc h a defi· 
nit ion of death . It may have an im· 
portant and , perhaps , h ighly unde-
sirable impact upon the attitudes of 
many in o ur society in regard to 
importa nt ethical dilemmas . Th is 
can be seen if we consider briefly 
the quest ions of euthanasia , abor· 
tion, a nd the treatme nt of the men-
tally retarded. 
I a m using the term euthanasia 
here to refe r to the active interven· 
tion of the human agent to br ing 
about death , not to the cessation 
o f attempts to prolong life . Perhaps 
the most characteristic defense of 
mercy killing as ethically acceptable 
is the argument that a system of 
e thics must be "humanistic or per· 
sonalistic, i.e., ... a value system 
that puts humanness and personal 
integrity above biological life and 
functio n".11 In other words, the 
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argum r in favor of euthana~w sug-
gests · t it may at times be neces-
sa ry t .nfl ic t damage upo n the phy-
sical t.tmensio n of man in order to 
show respect for his personality. The 
pe rsonal and physical a re separable 
and violation of the human pe rson 
consists primarily o f violation of the 
personal. "Biological life and func-
tion" are of only secondary impor-
tance; they are no t inviolable. 
It wo uld seem that any defin it ion 
of death that sees death in the pres-
ence o f spontaneous breathing and 
heartbeat canno t help but contri-
bute to the denial of the invio labil-
ity of the body, to the l-ean-do-what 
-1-want-~ith-my-body mentality. T he 
very fact tha t one can talk about 
huma n death while bodily life can 
be observed (I am not talking, o f 
course, about "life" provided by the 
respirator) suggests that bodily life 
is not sacred or essential to the un-
derstanding of what is human. While 
the support for neo co rtical death 
is in no .way the equivalent o f sup-
port fo r direct e uthanasia, it may 
very well be that in the larger con-
text of socia l attitudes, the move-
me nt toward such a defini tio n will 
give support to the euthanasia 
movement. 
While most of the ethical a rgu-
ments in defense of euthanasia and 
most of the proposals for legalizing 
euthanasia have been restricted to 
voluntary e uthanasia, there is an 
undercurrent of suppo rt for invol-
untary euthanasia as well. At this 
level, the argument goes something 
like this: the capacity for personal 
existence may be so diminished (as 
in ~he case of severely retarded in-
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fants) tha t certain "persons" sl ld 
not be considered hu·man and . IS, 
the ir lives sho uld be mere tly 
ended.12 The possible contrib n 
of a neocortical definition of ' th 
to this understanding o~ mat 1as 
already been discussed. 
An ethical argumeqt that is ed 
to defend both voluntary and ol· 
unta ry euthanasia is that there no 
significant ethical d ifference be-
tween allowing someone to di1 nd 
inte rvening to bring about hat 
death. Although it is a litt le ore 
diffic ult to see the connecti01 Lhe 
pro posed new defini tion of Hh 
may suppo rt this argument a ls• n 
ethical approach tha t denies ere 
is a ny diffe rence in the means ~ed 
in the achieving of a timely , ath 
is an approach that puts the pn ary 
emphasis on motivation and < in-
tended results and not on the ore 
"objective" factors like the at uns 
take n. It may very well be th, an 
understanding of death tha t en 1ha· 
sizes the capacity for personal ,ub· 
jective life will , in the develop ,1ent 
of a ttitudes, give support to '' pri-
marily subjective approach to e hies; 
wha t counts is the subject ive d1 11en· 
sion . 
It is not difficult to see ho\\ the 
emphasis on pe rsonal life as human 
life is much mo re c ongenia l to the · 
proponents tha n to the opponents 
of abortio n. Much of the abort ion 
debate revolves a round the question 
of what constitutes human life. life 
that has the right to be protected 
fro m destruction. The discussion, 
even the Supreme C ourt's January, 
1973, decision, includes such lan· 
guage as "persons in the whole 
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sense" and "capa ble o f meaningful 
life". Those who ·insist that biologi-
cal life of human parents is human 
life may find it increasingly more 
difficult to persuade people o f their 
position if medic ine a dopts a defi-
nition that, in princip le, separates 
human life from biological life. 
One might also wonder how such 
a definition of human death would 
affect the treatment in our society 
of the mentally reta rded. G ranted 
that ther~ is a differe nce be tween 
saying that human life is absent 
when the physiological pre requisite 
for consciousness has irrevocably 
ceased to func tio n and saying tha t 
someone with severely diminished 
mental capacity is no t human , the 
emphasis on the mental and the dec-
laratio n of non-humanhood despite 
biological life may reinforce the 
tendency to treat the retarded as 
less human or less than human . 
Joseph Fletcher has suggested that 
we might want to establish c riteria 
for humanhood that wo uld exclude 
those whose I.Q. score registers a t 
lower than 20.13 I do not know if 
Fletcher's pro posal will r ece iv e 
much acceptance in American soci-
~ty, but we canno t suppose that the 
Identificatio n of human life with 
personal life will have no impact on 
the ways we trea t the mentally re-
!arded. 
I reiterate that I am not equating 
the neoco rtical definition o f death 
With euthanasia o r the defe nse of 
e~thanasia ; I am not equating it 
WJth the view that the huma n fetus 
is_not human; I am not equating it 
WJth less than satisfactory care for 
the mentally retarded . What I am 







abortion, and care 'l f 
J constitute the larg,-r 
text in which the pro-
tition ought to be c on-
The J1l\lposal must be considered 
o n its own merits, of course. If the 
proposal is based on a valid under-
standing of the nature of huma n 
death a nd if such a clinical defini-
tion would be most useful in solving 
ethical dilemmas in medical prac-
tice, then it would probably be worth 
taking the chance that it might make 
an unfavorable contribution to the 
larger e thical context. I have already 
suggested, however, that this par-
tic ular understanding of death is 
questio nable. I wonder also if it is 
the best solution to the ethical di-
lemma. 
Tbe Dying Patient 
As was ind icated earlier, the pre-
sumed merit of such a definitio n is 
that it provides for a definite deter-
mination of when to cease treat-
ment. That may, in fact, be the mer-
it of testing for neocortical death; 
evidence of neocortical death prob-
ably should be taken as evidence 
that the person "is in the process of 
dying organ by organ".l4 Note that 
the emphasis here is on dying rather 
tha n on death ; evidence of neocor-
tical death should perhaps be taken 
as evide nce that the person is dying , 
not that he is already dead. This is 
facing t_he ethical dilemma head-on, 
for the real question is when to 
cease treating the dying. 
As Paul Ramsey has indicated so 
well, we should not treat the dying 
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in the tme way that we tr, a t the 
cural' 
It an certainly be said that ou r d ut ies 
to the dying differ radically from our 
duues to the living or to the potent ially 
still living. Just as it would be negligence 
to the sick to treat the m as if they were 
about to die, so it would be another sort 
of "negligence" to treat the dying as if 
they are going to get well or might get 
well. The right medical prac tice will pro-
vide those who may get well with the 
assistance they need a nd it will provide 
those who are dying with the care and 
assistance they need in their final passage. 
T o fail to distinguish between these two 
sorts of medical prac tice wou ld be to fail 
to act in accord with the facts ... It would 
be to act witho ut responsivity to those 
who have no longer any responsivity or 
~ecuperative powers.l5 
It would seem that the best medi-
cal care might be for the physician 
- who is the only one who can do 
it - to make the determination that 
this dying process has begun. Then 
proper treatment should become 
care for the dying, not struggle 
against death. Not all means must 
be used to prolong life; in fact, last 
days or hours filled with tubes and 
a grim losing battle against death 
might very well constitute "negli-
gence" to the patient. 
The determinatio n that the neo-
cortex is "dead" may be one of the 
ways of knowing that the time has 
come to treat this patient as dying 
and not as someone to be saved from 
dying. Thus the notion of neocor-
tical death can function as the pro-
ponents want it to, as a determina-
tion that treatment should end. It 
can function this way without the 
diffic~lties associated with defining 
death as personal death. 
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It is not easy , for the ph y~ 1n 
o r fo r the family , to decide to " se 
all treatment when it has been ~ r­
mined that the dying proces ,as 
begun. In some ways, it would >b-
ably be easier to declare the p ·nt 
dead than to "allow him to d i In 
the lo ng run , though, it may of 
more benefit to medicine and •c i-
e ty to go slowly. In the light 1 he 
wider ethical context discus!> in 
these pages, we should reco · ize 
that the change involved in t t re-
definition of death is a much g ·, tter 
departure from ·traditio nally a l ·pt-
ed medical practice than the c h tge 
involved in the practice of 10t 
attempting to prevent the l mg 
from dying. 
In summary, and with refe1 nee 
to the three questions with \' ich 
this paper began, this author \\ uld 
urge caution in adopting a ne >rti-
cal definition of death. Unles~ fur-
ther clarification indicates tha the 
biological is not being undervc. ued 
as a component of human lifL the 
definition may be philosoph t a lly 
unconvincing. The definitio r . it 
would appear, would likely lead to 
the strengthening of ethical atti-
tudes in our society that some of us 
would consider questionable or 
worse. And it is possible that the 
desired benefits could be accom-
plished without such a definition. 
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